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N the eighties, I served as an assistant United States attorney
("AUSA"), prosecuting primarily white collar crime. Lacking any
law enforcement experience, lacking, in fact, much legal experience
when I began the job, I learned much. Over the years as I became exper-
ienced, three things never ceased to surprise me. The first was the solem-
nity of the courtroom. Physically, the courtrooms were imposing:
cavernous, high-ceilinged, and wood paneled. Sounds echoed throughout
them. Judges sat up high and were stem-to everyone. Protocol was for-
mal. No matter who you were, unless it was your turn to talk and you
were at the podium speaking into the microphone, you did not speak.
Upon entering the courtrooms, the boldest defendants became deferen-
tial. The sloppiest lawyers came prepared. The simplest proceeding be-
came momentous. Trials were high drama.
The second fact that amazed me was the resources available to AUSAs
to investigate, prepare, and try our cases. Need to see someone's bank
records? Issue a subpoena. Need hundreds of financial transactions ana-
lyzed? Call the IRS. Need surveillance? Call the FBI. Need a judge to
issue court orders or search warrants? Forms, secretaries, and judges-on-
call were always available. Need to convince a reluctant person to talk?
Seek court-ordered immunity.
Of everything, though, the most startling revelation was the amount of
power I and every prosecutor had. There were plenty of experienced
prosecutors and agents to guide, advise, and help, and they did, but bot-
tom-line, the decisions-good and bad-were mine: who, when, how to
investigate; who to indict, when, and for what charges; what plea offer to
extend; and how to conduct my trials, which witnesses to call, and how to
present the evidence.1 The hundreds of decisions I and other AUSAs
* Bainbridge Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author
expresses her appreciation to Dean Ken Randall and the Alabama Law Foundation.
1. For sources discussing prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal
Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Wil-
liam F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982); Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of
Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115
(1998); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 713 (1999); Gail Heriot, An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction With Special
Reference to Punitive Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 43 (1996); Neil K. Komesar,
Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 465
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made every day changed the lives of others forever. When I began at the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") I was eager and aggressive. When I left
seven years later, I was humbled by the power of the office.
After seeing up close the power of federal prosecutors, I find it fasci-
nating that the DOJ is willing to share its prosecutorial power with pri-
vate individuals who are not part of the Department. This article focuses
on this delegation of power. Study of it is important for three reasons:
first, delegation of prosecutorial power to private individuals by the DOJ
and state Attorneys General is increasingly prevalent; second, such dele-
gation is proving enormously successful as a law enforcement tool; and
third, delegation to private prosecutors is likely to expand further.
Most of the delegation of prosecutorial power by the DOJ in recent
years has been in an area where the DOJ could use help: white collar
crime. This context is significant because the breadth of white collar of-
fenses allows for even greater prosecutorial discretion than usual-for
public or private prosecutors. 2 Assessing whether conduct is fraud, or
simply aggressive business tactics, is like trying to grab water. It is elu-
sive. Business fraud that some prosecutors ignore, others charge as multi-
ple felonies. Entrepreneurs and executives whom some prosecutors
would never charge will be named by others as aiders and abettors, or co-
conspirators.3 In truth, because of the nature of white collar crime, dele-
gation of prosecutorial power in this area compounds the strengths and
weaknesses of the "private attorney general" concept.
This article is the seventh, and last, in a series on the delegation of
prosecutorial power to private parties. 4 This series has offered the fol-
lowing observations: First, giving private individuals the right to sue for
damages caused to those individuals is not new and does not delegate
(1997); John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439 (1974); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discre-
tionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White
Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391 (1994) [hereinafter
Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime]; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999).
2. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct,
60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 37 (1997); William J. Stuntz, The Legal Construction of
Norms: Self-Dealing Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1883-85 (2000).
3. See Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8
BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 310-12 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, Carrots and Sticks] (discussing
complicity liability); see also id. at 310-12 (discussing conspiracy liability).
4. See James F. Barger, Pamela H. Bucy, Melinda M. Eubanks, Marc S. Raspanti,
States, Statutes and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 465 (2005) [hereinafter Statutes and Fraud] (discussing states' passage of private at-
torney statutes); Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated
Games and Close-Knit Groups, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1021 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, Iterated
Games]; Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (2004) [hereinafter Bucy, Games and Stories]; Pamela H. Bucy,
Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939 (2002) [hereinafter Bucy, Private
Justice and the Constitution]; Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regula-
tory World, 39 Hous. L. REV. 905 (2002) [hereinafter Bucy, Information as a Commodity];




much power.5 Second, delegating to a private individual the right to
bring a punitive action for public injuries when the individual has not per-
sonally been damaged is new and delegates considerable prosecutorial
power.6 Third, this latter delegation of power to private parties presents
tremendous potential assistance to law enforcement when private parties
bring valuable and otherwise unavailable resources to law enforcement's
efforts.7 Fourth, delegation of prosecutorial power to private persons
also risks squandering law enforcement and judicial resources, disrupting
executive branch operations, and harming honest businesses. 8 Fifth, spe-
cific statutory amendments in the delegation of prosecutorial power to
private individuals are needed to maximize the benefits and to minimize
the costs of this delegation.9 Sixth, once refined, the "private attorney
general" concept should be expanded to other areas where it can be help-
ful, such as protection of financial markets, the environment, and against
terrorism. 10
Although I, and others, have studied delegation of prosecutorial
power, one issue that none of us have yet addressed is whether it matters
who prosecutes. More precisely, to the extent the law communicates and
shapes society's values, does a private plaintiff who brings a civil suit
communicate and shape these values differently than does a prosecutor
who brings a criminal case? A related question is whether the law's com-
munication and norm shaping functions are affected if the private person
and the government prosecutor together pursue a case through a hybrid
civil/criminal action.
Before turning to these questions in Part IV, this article addresses
three preliminary issues. Part I looks at the nature of white collar prose-
cutions, specifically at the trend of using punitive civil actions instead of
criminal prosecution. Part II examines the emerging role of private indi-
viduals as prosecutors of white collar crime. Part III briefly reviews juris-
prudence about the law's expressive function.
I. THE NATURE OF WHITE COLLAR PROSECUTIONS:
THE TREND TOWARD GREATER USE OF
PUNITIVE CIVIL ACTIONS
In a 1992 article, Kenneth Mann identified an emerging trend: the use
of punitive civil actions as an alternative to, or supplement to, criminal
5. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 7-8 & 13-53.
6. See id. at 43-45.
7. See id. at 53-62; see also Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 940-
47.
8. See Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 4, at 677-697 & Appendix A (Charts 1-43)
(listing the costs of delegating prosecutorial power); Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitu-
tion, supra note 4, at 949-978; Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 62-68.
9. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 74-76.
10. See id. at 20, 76-80; cf. Statutes and Fraud, supra note 4, at 478-88 (discussing states'
passage of private attorney statutes).
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prosecution." The goal of punitive civil actions, which can be brought by
private parties as well as the government, is to punish. 12 Suits brought
under statutes such as the Clayton Act, 13 the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),14 and the Computer, Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA") 15 typify such actions. These statutes provide civil
causes of action for those damaged by a defendant's conduct. They carry
mandatory treble damages. 16 Often brought as class actions, cases invok-
ing these statutes present enormous civil liability for defendants.1 7 They
may be brought by anyone damaged by a defendant's conduct. 18 The
civil False Claims Act ("FCA"),19 which is aimed at government contrac-
tors who file false claims or otherwise defraud the federal government, 20
is a different type of punitive civil action. In two ways, it goes further in
empowering private plaintiffs. First, the FCA carries not only treble
damages but mandatory penalties. 21 The combined damages and penal-
ties can be huge, approaching $1 billion in recent cases.22 Second, the
11. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798-99 (1992) [hereinafter Mann, Punitive Civil Sanc-
tions] ("Punitive civil sanctions are replacing a significant part of the criminal law in critical
areas of law... because they carry tremendous punitive power."); cf. PAMELA H. Bucv,
WHIm COLLAR PRACTICE 4 (3rd ed. 2004) [hereinafter Bucy, WHITE COLLAR PRACTICE]
(commenting on the tendency of white collar crime to blur the distinction between criminal
and civil law and noting the increasing use of civil prosecution of white collar crime); Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Crucial Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1325, 1389 (1991) [hereinafter Cheh, Constitutional Limits]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Un-
lawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing TortCrime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 198-99 & 230-31 (1991) (chronicling trends in criminal
law and the resultant interchangeability of criminal law with civil remedies); Susan R.
Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 717 (1999);
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, Crimtorts as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 289 (1998); Lynch, supra note 2, at 26-37; Podgor, Corporate and White Collar
Crime, supra note 1, at 393-95 (highlighting the difficulties of applying traditional criminal
sanctions to corporations guilty of white collar crime).
12. Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, supra note 11, at 1798 (1992).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1997 & Supp. 2005).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2005). Shaw v. Toshiba American Information
Systems, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000), demonstrates the CFAA's potential as a
private action. In this class action brought under the CFAA, the parties settled the action
for $2.1 billion with an additional $147.5 million in attorneys fees. Id. at 961. The case
centered around the allegation that Toshiba and NEC Electronics "designed, manufac-
tured, created, distributed, sold, transmitted, and marketed faulty floppy-diskette control-
lers ("FCD's") containing allegedly defective microcode." Id. at 945.
16. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1997); RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000); CFAA,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
17. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 17-18.
18. Id. at 17-19.
19. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2003).
20. See id. § 3729(a).
21. Id.
22. For example, recent judgments in FCA qui tam cases include a $875 million settle-
ment from TAP Pharmaceuticals, 55 Healthcare Financial Management 10 (2002), a $745
million settlement with HCA Healthcare Corporation to resolve some of the alleged FCA
violations pending against HCA; a $385 million settlement with National Medical Care,
Inc., a $325 million settlement with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratorie, a $325 mil-
lion settlement with National Medical Enterprises, and a $110 million settlement with Na-
[Vol. 59
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FCA gives individuals who have not been damaged by the defendant's
conduct the right to sue. "Any person, '23 including those who have never
been affected by the defendant's actions, may bring a lawsuit under the
FCA.
All of these punitive civil actions (the Clayton Act, RICO, CFAA and
FCA) apply to conduct that could also be pursued as a criminal prosecu-
tion. For law enforcement, punitive civil actions provide a number of ad-
vantages over criminal prosecution. Most obviously, the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard of proof applicable in civil cases is considerably
easier to meet than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal
cases. 24 Also, the mens rea requirement in civil actions (usually "reckless
disregard for the truth"25) is easier to prove than that in the typical crimi-
nal case ("willfully" 2 6 or "intent to defraud" 27). Prosecutors who are con-
cerned with sending a message often find punitive civil actions to be just
as effective of a deterrent, if not more so-especially when the defendant
is a corporation-than criminal prosecution, because of the large mone-
tary judgments rendered. 28 In fact, punitive civil actions can provide con-
siderable deterrence because of the "collateral consequences" that flow
from a finding of liability in a punitive civil action. These consequences
include "debarment" and "exclusion," which prevent individuals and
companies from future contracting with federal and state governments,
loss of professional licenses and credentials, loss of accreditation, and lia-
bility in related lawsuits through collateral estoppel.29 These "collateral
consequences" can devastate a business or professional. In addition,
there are fewer procedural protections accorded defendants in civil cases
than in criminal cases. The Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, for exam-
ple, do not apply in civil cases.30 Discovery rules are broader in civil
tional Health Laboratories. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM AcTIONS
§ 1.05[A] (Aspen 2004) [hereinafter BOESE, FALSE CLAIMS].
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2003).
24. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 917-18; Abraham S. Goldstein,
White Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101 YALE L.J. 1895, 1897 (1995) [hereinafter
Goldstein, White Collar Crime].
25. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2003).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000 and Supp. 2005).
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
28. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 918 ("The sanctions imposed
in [punitive civil] actions can have enormous deterrent impact for they impose large penal-
ties and can lead to imposition of collateral sanctions, such as exclusion from conducting
future business or from one's profession altogether.")
29. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Civil Prosecution of Health Care Fraud, 30 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 693, 693, 720-757 (discussing collateral consequences of exclusion from gov-
ernment contracting, administrative penalties, suspension of payments due a provider for
services already rendered under government health insurance programs, loss of profes-
sional licenses, and loss of hospital staff privileges).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V& VI; see, e.g., Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 11, at
1389-91 (detailing the constitutional rights afforded a person in criminal proceedings and
how these rights may be undermined when a defendant is subject to both a criminal and a
civil proceeding for the same conduct); Goldstein, White-Collar Crime, supra note 24, at
1897 (observing that civil sanctions provide fewer procedural protections, such as a lower
2006]
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cases than in criminal cases where interrogatories and depositions are not
allowed 31 and where any information acquired in the grand jury must be
kept secret.32 Such secrecy is an especially troublesome hurdle in white
collar cases where criminal prosecutors often need to consult with civil
government attorneys or other experts during the investigation to evalu-
ate the case. 33
All of these advantages of punitive civil actions over criminal actions
become more pronounced in the prosecution of white collar cases which
are hard to prove. 34 Asking a jury to convict a defendant of white collar
crime is difficult because the conduct at issue is complex, hidden deep
within an organization, and often is not viewed by the public as wrong.35
White collar defendants generally are respected citizens who may have
done much good for their communities. They will have the resources to
hire outstanding legal talent to represent them. It is little wonder that
burden of proof, than do criminal sanctions); Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Mus-
ings in the Tort/Crime Distinction 76 B.U. L. REV. 215, 219-20 (1996) [hereinafter Marks,
Utility and Community] (highlighting conceptual differences between criminal law and tort
law).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) (depositions of witnesses permitted only upon court order
after a finding of "exceptional circumstances" and "interest of justice").
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423-427
(1983).
33. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATYn's MANUAL §§ 5-11.112-11.113 (2d ed.
2005 Supp.).
34. White collar crimes, in general, are difficult to investigate and prove. White Collar
Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1986)
[hereinafter White Collar Crime Hearing] (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen); MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE
CRIME 95 (1980); JOHN E. CONKLIN, ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL 17-18 (1977); PETER
FINN & ALAN R. HOFFMAN, PROSECUTION OF ECONOMIC CRIME 4 (1976); JOHN A. GAR-
DINER & THEODORE R. LYMAN, THE FRAUD CONTROL GAME 87 (1984).
White collar crime is rarely self-evident. White Collar Crime Hearing, supra note 34 (tes-
timony of United States Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen); FINN & HOFFMAN,
supra note 34. Victims of assaults know immediately when they have been assaulted, but
victims of fraud may never know they have been defrauded. See AUGUST BEQUAI, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH-CENTURY CRISIS 12, 65 (1978); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 232 (1983); Herbert Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact
and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, in CRIME AT THE Top 44, 51 (John M. Johnson &
Jack D. Douglas eds., 1978). This failure to realize that one has been defrauded is due, in
part, to the fact that the perpetrator is usually in a position of trust with the victim. White
Collar Crime Hearing, supra note 34 (testimony of United States Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral D. Lowell Jensen). Because of this relationship, a fraud victim has no reason to sus-
pect criminal activity, even when circumstances occur that would otherwise make the
victim suspicious.
For sources discussing the difficulty of proving intent in white collar cases, see Sharon L.
Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care
Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GA. L. REV. 373, 397-99 (1997); Stuart P. Green, Why it's a Crime to
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Of-
fenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1614-15 (1997); Peter J. Henning, Individual Liability for Con-
duct by Criminal Organizations in the United States, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1305, 1324, 1328-29
(1998); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
557, 563-65 (1998); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
79-80 (1933); cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 453, 488 (1997).
35. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care
Providers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 855, 875-78 (1989).
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prosecutors embrace punitive civil actions in white collar cases. 36
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AS
PROSECUTORS OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME
Under any number of statutes, private citizens who have been harmed
by a defendant's conduct are given the right to bring civil suits for large
damages against the defendant. 37 This is not new nor is this the delega-
36. The [civil] False Claims Act has been an essential tool to protect the integ-
rity of the Medicare program .... To achieve this goal.., of 'zero tolerance'
of Medicare fraud and abuse . . . the Government relies on a number of
enforcement options- criminal, civil, and administrative, as well as educa-
tional outreach efforts. Chief among the enforcement tools has been the
False Claims Act.
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, THE 1986 FALSE CLAIMS Acr AMENDMENTS, TENTH ANNI-
VERSARY REPORT 15 (1996) (testimony of Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General,
Dep't of Health & Human Services). See also Hearings Before House Comm. on Judiciary,
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1998) [hereinafter Sub-
comm. on Claims Hearings] (testimony of Donald K. Stern, U.S. Attorney, Dist. Mass. and
Chair, Attorney General's Advisory Comm., Dep't of Justice) (" [T]he False Claims Act ...
has been the Department's primary civil enforcement tool to combat fraud .... ); id. at 25
(testimony of Robert A. Berenson, Director, Center for Health Care Plans and Provides
Administration, Health Care Financing Administration, Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices) ("[T]he False Claims Act is an important tool for ... law enforcement ... to pursue
fraud and abuse."). Ruth Blacker of the American Association of Retired Persons stated:
Congress in recent years [has] expand[ed] statutory authority and income
resources to deal with the problem [of heath care fraud and abuse]. How-
ever, none of these things are likely to play a more important role in recover-
ing improper payments or in acting as a deterrent than the False Claims Act.
Use of the FCA by Federal authorities has become an important tool for
fighting fraud and abuse in many programs, including the Medicare program.
Id. at 63 (statement of Ruth Blacker, National Legislative Counsel, American Association
of Retired Persons).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2003); Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000 and Supp. 2005); Consumer Product Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1998); American's with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(1995); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994). The ADA's provision is illus-
trative: "The remedies and procedures set forth in [this statute] are ... provide[d] to any
person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this
[statute] .. " 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2005) (providing standing for one who "has reason-
able grounds for believing that [he or she] is about to be subjected to discrimination").
In addition to statutorily created private causes of action for victims of wrongdoing,
there are court-implied private causes of action for those who have been injured by de-
fendants' breaches of statutorily imposed duties. Judicial implication of private causes of
action began in 1916 when the handhold on a boxcar gave way as a Texas railroad
switchman was climbing down the boxcar. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 214 U.S. 33
(1916). In Rigsby, the Supreme Court held that Rigsby, the switchman, could bring a suit
for damages under the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA"), even though the statute
was a penal offense and provided no explicit cause of action for individuals. Id. at 38-39.
The Court reasoned that railway employees were among the intended beneficiaries of the
FSAA, which specifically required "secure hand holds" on all railroad cars "having lad-
ders." Id. at 37. According to the Court: "[where] disregard of ... the statute.., results in
damage to one ... for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied." Id. at 39.
Over the next sixty-plus years, courts liberally implied causes of action under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles VI, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et.
seq.; Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1 et. seq.; Guardian Assn. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 594 (1983) (assuming that there is an implied cause of action, with-
out explicitly holding as such); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979); J.I. Case
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tion of prosecutorial power this article addresses. Rather, it is statutes
with the following two features that raise the policy issues targeted in this
article: (1) private citizens who have not been damaged in any way by the
defendant's conduct are given the right to file suit against defendants, and
(2) the damages available are so large as to be viewed as "punitive." The
civil FCA passed by Congress in 1863 contains both features. 38 Eyeing
the success of the FCA, a number of states have passed similar statutes.39
Under these statutes, private persons who wish to file suit are not re-
quired to obtain permission or clearance of any sort before suing. They
alone decide who, what, how, and whether to charge a defendant. 40 Once
the private individual has alerted government officials that she intends to
file suit and has done SO,4 1 the relevant prosecuting authority (state or
federal, as the case may be) reviews the plaintiff's information and deter-
mines whether it will join the suit as co-plaintiff.42 Even if the relevant
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426-27, 430-31 (1964) (implying a cause of action under § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186, 232-35 (1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 356
(1982); Voting Rights Act, of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et. seq.
The courts have also declined to imply private causes of action under the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1995), Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1999); Breitweiser v.
KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1393 (5th Cir. 1972) (declining to imply a private cause of
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (showing persons whose constitutional or federal statutory rights had
been abridged by federal law enforcement officials).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2003) provides that "a person" may bring a civil action under
the False Claims Act.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision in Ver-
mont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000)
under an assignment theory. After noting that the relator, Jonathan Stevens, had not been
damaged or harmed by the defendant's conduct, id. at 772-73, the Court held that "[t]he
FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's
damages claim. . . We conclude ... that the United States' injury in fact suffices to confer
standing on respondent .... " Id. at 772-73.
39. States and Fraud, supra note 4, at 489-94 (Appendix A).
40. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(A), 3730(b) (2003). Typical private plaintiffs (known as "rela-
tors") include current or former employees, competitors and competitors' employees, state
and local governments, special interest groups (such as "Taxpayers Against Fraud"), attor-
neys and law firms who discover fraud in the course of representing clients in other mat-
ters. BOESE, FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 22, § 4.01[B]. Boese's treatise is an excellent
resource on the False Claims Act.
41. The qui tam complaint is sealed and not served on the defendant or made public in
any way. The entire action is stayed while the federal government (acting through the
DOJ) is notified of the lawsuit by service of a copy of the complaint and "written disclo-
sure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses." 31
U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2)-(3) (2003). The written disclosure to the government by a relator "of
substantially all material evidence and information" helps the government focus its evalua-
tion of the relator's claims. United States ex rel. Made in the USA Found. v. Billington,
985 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1997); BOESE, FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 22, § 4.04.
42. While the complaint remains under seal, the DOJ evaluates the case and deter-
mines whether it will intervene. BOESE, FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 22, § 4.05. Historically,
relators who proceed on their own after the DOJ has declined to intervene as a plaintiff
have enjoyed little success. Their cases are dismissed more often and their recoveries are
substantially less. The litigational advantages to private plaintiffs of obtaining DOJ inter-
vention are so substantial that the acknowledged goal of any experienced relators' attorney
is to obtain the government's intervention. As one experienced relator's counsel explained:
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governmental authority declines to join the lawsuit as plaintiff, the pri-
vate party (known as a "relator") is allowed to continue the case.43 If the
governmental entity joins the lawsuit ("intervenes") as co-plaintiff, the
private party and the government continue together to pursue the case to
conclusion.44 The relator is integrally included in the pursuit of the
action. 45
In creating this unusual prosecutorial partnership, 46 Congress noted
the value private parties can bring to law enforcement's efforts to detect
and deter fraud.47 In Congress's view, individuals within an industry or
"When evaluating a case and during the beginning stages of representing a whistle blower
never forget your initial mission: persuade the government to pursue the case." Mitchell
Kreindler, So You Wanna Be a Whistleblower's Lawyer?, Address before the ABA Na-
tional Institute, THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND Qui TAM ENFORCEMENT 5 (Nov. 28,
2001).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2003). If the relator proceeds as the sole plaintiff after the
DOJ has declined to intervene, the DOJ may request to receive copies of all pleadings filed
and deposition transcripts (at the Government's expense). Upon a showing of "good
cause," the court may permit the Government to intervene "at a later date." Id.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (2003). During the litigation, the relator's role may be re-
stricted by the court "[u]pon a showing by the Government that the unrestricted participa-
tion during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would interfere
with or unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious,
irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment," 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)(2)(C) (2003), or "[u]pon a
showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation
by the person initiating the action would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the
defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)(2)(D) (2003).
45. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2003). Some relators have successfully objected to proposed
settlements between the government and qui tam defendants. See, e.g., Gravitt v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Ohio), dismissed, 848 F.2d 190, 190 (6th Cir. 1988).
46. Passed in 1863, the FCA provided the federal government with a way of combating
the fraud suffered by the Union Army when it received deliveries of defective or nonexist-
ing military supplies. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5273 (132 Cong. Rec. 16,22339 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berman)). According to the
1863 investigation, one thousand mules delivered to the Union army were "unfit for the
service, and almost worthless, for being too old or too young, blind, weak-eyed, damaged,
worn out or diseased." Id. See generally False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R.
3334 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings: False Claims Act Amendments]; J.
Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78
N.C. L. REV. 539 (2000) [hereinafter Qui Tam Legislation]; Note, The History and Devel-
opment of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81 (1972) [hereinafter History of Qui Tam].
The original FCA, passed in 1863, provided both criminal and civil penalties
for its violation. In 1874, the criminal and civil provisions were separately
codified. Prior to 1986, the FCA was amended several times in ways that
weakened qui tam actions, so that they were rarely and ineffectively used. In
1986, Congress substantially amended the FCA, invigorating qui tam actions.
The 1986 amendments increased the amount of recovery a relator could ob-
tain, established a generous mandatory minimum recovery for relators, and
relaxed provisions that had prevented many relators from filing suit. Other
amendments made FCA cases easier to prove overall, thereby improving all
plaintiffs' chances of success. These amendments included relaxing the mens
rea requirement, expanding the statute of limitations, and clarifying that the
preponderance burden of proof, rather than a clear and convincing burden of
proof, applies to FCA cases. The 1986 amendments also provided a cause of
action for relators who suffer retribution from employers for whistleblower
activities related to the FCA.
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4 at 45-47.
47. Beck, Qui Tam Legislation, supra note 46, at 556.
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company are better positioned to detect fraud, especially complex fraud,
than are outside law enforcement officials.48 Insiders are likely to know
about corporate wrongdoing long before law enforcement officials learn
of it.49 They know who is doing it, who knows about it, which records
prove it, where relevant documents are located, and how to interpret
facts, records and transactions.50 The FCA's structure,51 enhanced by
48. Id.; cf. Complex economic wrongdoing cannot be detected or deterred effectively
without the help of insiders, those who are intimately familiar with it. Inside information
can alert regulators and the public to ongoing or inchoate wrongdoing; in many cases,
before harm has occurred. Insiders can also guide public regulators as they investigate
questionable activity and can help overcome concealment and cover-ups. Government of-
ficials confirm the importance of insiders: "Whistleblowers are essential to our operation.
Without them, we wouldn't have cases." Justin Gillis, Whistleblowing: What Price Among
Scientists?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at A21 (quoting Lawrence J. Rhoades, a division
director at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which polices federal
health research for scientific misconduct); see also Health Care Initiatives Under the False
Claims Act that Impact Hospitals: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration &
Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1998) [hereinafter Subcomm. on
Claims Hearing] (statement by Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Af-
fairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (indicating that the FCA, a purpose
of which is to encourage whistleblowing, has been an essential tool in combating fraud).
49. Knowledgeable insiders can identify abuses that public regulators do not even
know to look for. Part A Medicare fraud is a good example of this. Medicare, created in
1965, pays for most health care expenses incurred by persons over the age of sixty-five.
Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg (2003 & Supp. 2005); see Joe Baker, Medicare:
Nuts and Bolts, 311 PLI/EST 83, 85 (2001). Medicare is divided into Part A and Part B.
(The Medicare program is actually divided into three parts; however, Part C, which con-
tains the Medicare+Choice program, is not relevant to this discussion. See id.). Part A
reimbursements go primarily to institutional health care providers like hospitals, home
health agencies, and insurance companies that contract with the federal government to
process Medicare claims. Part B reimbursements go to individual providers like physicians.
The process by which Part A and Part B providers seek reimbursement differs considera-
bly in philosophy, procedure, deadlines, and reimbursement rates. Id.
Although health care fraud has been a top priority of the DOJ since the mid-eighties,
most of the health care fraud investigations in the eighties and nineties were directed at
Part B fraud. (See Pamela H. Bucy, The Path From Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 3, 35-36 (2000) (discussing the Department of Health and Human Services'
PATH initiative, which followed its investigation of Medicare Part B payment to teaching
physicians); Gordon Witkin et al., Health Care Fraud, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 24,
1992, at 34 (providing examples of Medicare Part B fraud); see also Mark Taylor, Spotlight
on CFOs: As Feds Have Grown Savvier, Bean Counters Increasingly Have Been Targets in
Fraud Probes, 52 MODERN HEALTI-HCARE, June 7, 1999 (reporting that federal prosecution
of healthcare cases previously focused on Medicaid fee-for-service and Medicare Part B
physician fraud because the few federal prosecutors and investigating agents were trained
only in simple fraud schemes). It was not until whistleblowers alerted the DOJ to various
types of Part A fraud that the DOJ began to focus closely on it. (Barbara Bisno, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida, Address at the American Bar Association
White Collar Crime Institute, Session on Health Care Fraud, Miami, Florida (May 2000)).
Today, Part A Medicare fraud is a high priority of the DOJ. Geraldine Nicholson & Lena
Roberts. Symposium: The Reasonable and Necessary Criterion and Medicare Contractor
Review of Claims: Efforts to Combat Fraud, Waste and Abuse in the Medicare Program, 43
ST. Louis U. L.J. 81, 84 (1999) (discussing the DOJ-administered Health Care Fraud and
Abuse Control account, funded through the Medicare Part A Trust Fund).
50. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 943-44.
51. The FCA has proven to be highly effective in recruiting legal talent who have the
skill and resources to handle complex, expensive cases. Because of the large recoveries
available to private plaintiffs under the FCA through statutorily mandated percentages of
large, fixed penalties, private plaintiffs' counsel can receive large fees since their fees tend
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FCA practice, 52 not only brings to law enforcement such "inside" infor-
mation about fraud, it also brings forth capable private counsel who un-
dertake FCA cases on behalf of relators. These counsel can provide
important assistance to public prosecutors by collecting evidence, mar-
shaling facts, conducting discovery, and preparing witnesses.53
In crafting the FCA, Congress also recognized the significant hardship
any private individual may encounter when filing suit under the FCA.54
to be a combination of court-awarded attorneys fees and a percentage of the recovery they
negotiated pre-trial with their clients. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against
Fraud v. Gen. Elec., 41 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994).
52. The structural design of the qui tam provisions of the FCA also discourages inex-
perienced or unskilled counsel. Because of DOJ's resources, the goal of any relator is to
convince the DOJ of a case's merit so that the DOJ will intervene and take "primary
responsibility" for the case. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2001); Bucy, Private Justice, supra note
4, at 51-53. Relators' counsel does this by presenting to the DOJ, at the time the complaint
is filed (under seal), a thorough, well-thought-out, carefully researched report describing
exactly how fraud was committed and how it can be proven in the highly complex, regula-
tory area of government contracting. The demanding nature of this task requires skilled
counsel and deters unskilled or inexperienced counsel. Such an undertaking is simply too
difficult and time-consuming for inexperienced counsel, especially if-as is almost cer-
tain-counsel is working on a contingency fee basis. Id. at 52, 58.
53. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 58-59.
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (grants private persons who serve as relators a significant per-
centage of any recovery); Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 948-958.
Surveys of whistleblowers consistently show the hardship and retribution these individuals
experience. For example, in one survey of ninety whistleblowers, 54% said they were
harassed at work, 82% were harassed by superiors, 80% reported physical deterioration
following their whistleblowing experience, and 86% reported "negative emotional conse-
quences, including feelings of depression, powerlessness, isolation, anxiety and anger."
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Survey of Whistle Blowers Finds Retaliation but Few Regrets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, at A22 [hereinafter Farnsworth, Survey].
Insiders who remain employed after blowing the whistle do not usually last long at work.
It becomes too miserable. They face ostracism, hostility and rejection, taunting co-workers,
see Robert Lipsyte, What Happens After the Whistle Blows?, A Tennessee Professor's Alle-
gations of Athletic Abuses Haunts Her Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2000, at D1-D, abusive
supervisors, see Leo Kohls, Refusing to Drive Unsafe Vehicles, in WHISTLE-BLOWING: Loy-
ALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 95-97 (Alan F. Westin et al. eds., 1981), attacks
on their professional abilities see Henry I. Kurtz, Asserting Professional Ethics Against
Dangerous Drug Test, in WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORA-
TION 107-08, 113 (Alan F. Westin et al. eds., 1981) and sometimes, threats of physical harm(Editorial, An Independent Police Probe for D.C., WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A18).
There are health effects for whistleblowers. Studies show that whistleblowers experience
stress-related physical symptoms during their whistleblowing experiences, including diffi-
culty sleeping, anxiety, panic attacks, depression, suicidal thoughts, feelings of guilt and
worthlessness, loss of appetite and weight, high blood pressure, heart palpitations, hair
loss, nightmares, headaches, weeping, and tremors. K. Jean Lennane, "Whistleblowing ": A
Health Issue, 307 BRITISH MED. J. 667, 668 (1993). See generally DEAN B. PESKIN,
SACKED! WHAT TO Do WHEN You LOSE YOUR JOB 1-23 (1979) (discussing the emotional
traumas associated with job loss).
Families of whistleblowers suffer also, with forced moves, scaled-back living, marital
stress, depletion of savings, and health problems. Lennane, supra at 668.
Job loss is probably the most consistently identified consequence of blowing the whistle,
although whistleblowers may experience informal, job-related repercussions short of job
loss or prior to job loss, such as isolation, abuse, forced psychiatric referral, impossible
demands by supervisors, threats of defamation or disciplinary actions, demotion, or reas-
signments. Id. at 668-69; MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE:
THE ORGANIZATION AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 79-80(1992); Alan F. Westin, Conclusion: What Can and Should Be Done to Protect Whistle
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To help overcome disincentives to file suit, Congress made sure the FCA
provides a large monetary reward to insiders who come forward and file
suit. "Relators" are guaranteed a generous percentage of any judgment
recovered,55 and because FCA judgments can be quite large, 56 a success-
ful relator's share can be very significant. Recent FCA judgments, for
example, have topped $875 million, $745 million, and $385 million. 57 Re-
cent relators' awards have been $95 million, $44.8 million, and $28.9
million.58
Interestingly, over the years another incentive for relators has evolved:
favorable publicity. Headlines praise whistleblowers. For example, in
2003, Time Magazine named three whistleblowers, Cynthia Cooper of
WorldCom, Colleen Rowley of the FBI, and Sherron Watkins of Enron,
as "Persons of the Year."'59 Given the disdain in which whistleblowers
sometimes are held by the general public, 60 such positive, public rein-
forcement is important.61
Enlisting support of private citizens by giving them prosecutorial power
is not a panacea, however. Experience with the FCA has shown some of
the costs of delegating prosecutorial power. Law enforcement has to
spend time and effort providing guidance to private party litigants and
monitoring FCA lawsuits brought by private parties. Because law en-
forcement has scarce resources, diverting resources to provide this gui-
dance means that law enforcement can not pursue other meritorious
enforcement activities.62 Also, concern by law enforcement and busi-
nesses that ill-informed or vindictive persons may file non-meritorious
Blowers in Industry, in WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION
132-33 (Alan F. Westin et al. eds., 1981).
There are cultural disincentives to providing information about wrongdoing by others.
Whistleblowers often face ostracism from long-time friends and colleagues once it becomes
known that they have volunteered information of wrongdoing. Albert D. Clark, Ethical
Implications of Whistle Blowing, 42 LA. B.J. 364, 365 (1994).
55. If the government joins the relator's case, the relator is guaranteed at least 15% of
any judgment or settlement and the court can award more-up to 25%. If the government
does not join the lawsuit, the relator is guaranteed 25% and could receive up to 30%. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2003).
56. For example, recent judgments in FCA qui tam cases include an $875 million set-
tlement from TAP Pharmaceuticals, 55 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGT. 10 (2002); a $745 million
settlement with HCA Healthcare Corporation to resolve some of the alleged FCA viola-
tions pending against HCA; a $385 million settlement with National Medical Care, Inc.; a
$325 million settlement with SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratory; a $325 million set-
tlement with National Medical Enterprises; and a $110 million settlement with National
Health Laboratories. BOESE, FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 22, § 1.05[A].
57. FCA News: Top Qui Tam Recoveries of the Year 2000, 21 TAXPAYERS AGAINST
FRAUD Q. REV. 16, 20-21 (2001) [hereinafter FCN News] (reproducing a November 2,
2000, press release from Department of Justice).
58. Id.
59. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30/Jan. 6
(2003). Time explained why it chose them for its honor: "These women were ... heroes at
the scene .... They were people who did right just by doing their jobs.., with the bravery
the rest of us always hope we have and may never know if we do." Id. at 32.
60. See supra note 30.
61. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 969.
62. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 64.
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suits under the FCA stymies law enforcement's flexibility when dealing
with regulated industries. Even when industry and government officials
wish to draft broad, hortatory, and ambitious guidelines that give regula-
tors and industry flexibility, they may opt not do so because such broad
guidelines subject industry to expansive liability at the hands of private
litigants.63 Moreover, litigation arising from privately-brought FCA ac-
tions binds regulators through precedent created since qui tam relators
and DOJ prosecutors rely upon common causes of action.
64
FCA actions brought by relators also impose costs on the judicial sys-
tem. Courts are called upon to resolve conflicts between law enforce-
ment officials and private litigants in FCA cases.65 Disputes arise when
the DOJ and the relator disagree about how to conduct the case: whether
certain discovery should proceed, whether settlements should be ac-
cepted, whether the case has merit, and whether it should be dismissed.
Not only are judicial resources consumed by the need to resolve conflicts
between plaintiffs, but refereeing between public and private plaintiffs
thrusts the courts into the sensitive position of evaluating, even micro-
managing, the executive branch's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
66
The FCA attempts to address these problems by imposing a series of
quality controls and checks and balances on relators' conduct, such as
requiring would-be relators to provide the DOJ with extensive informa-
tion about any lawsuit they intend to file prior to filing;67 requiring that
relators' lawsuits remain sealed until the DOJ evaluates the case and de-
cides whether to join as plaintiff,68 or even to move for dismissal;69 and
giving the DOJ authority to seek restrictions on the relator's conduct of
the case. 70
In summary, although legislatures have not yet adequately addressed
the problems created by delegation of prosecutorial power to private in-
dividuals, 71 such public-private partnerships are feasible models for effec-
tive law enforcement. This prosecutorial partnership has proven
successful and is likely to be extended.72
63. Id. at 64-65.
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id. at 67-68; Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 959-961;
Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 4, at 619-624.
66. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 959-961.
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
68. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
69. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
70. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(c) (2003).
71. Commentators have argued that the FCA would work more effectively if DOJ was
more pro-active in moving for dismissal of frivolous or ill-considered relator lawsuits.
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 72 n.384 (list of commentators). Additional reforms
are also needed, such as mandatory delay of discovery by plaintiffs until after the court has
ruled on defendant's motion to dismiss, imposition of a heightened pleading standard,
greater sanctions for relators who bring frivolous FCA actions and abolition of joint and
several liability in FCA lawsuits. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 70-76.
72. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 76-79. The FCA has been heralded as one of
the most effective crime-fighting tools ever devised. For example, in fiscal year 2000 the
"United States collected a record $1.5 billion in civil fraud recoveries," most of which, $1.2
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III. THE LAW'S EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION
South St. Louis in the early 1900s was full of poor, recent immigrants.
It was a rough place. Among the troublemakers, one stood out. Re-
sponding to neighbors' complaints, a police officer went to the man's
home. From prior visits to the home, the officer knew that two people
lived there, the man and his young daughter. Eventually, the man
came to the door. Drunk, he snarled, "What do you want?" The of-
ficer explained, "We've had reports, sir, that, well, you've been having
relations with your daughter. " Staring blankly at the officer, the man
grumbled, "So?" The officer continued, "You can't do that. It's
wrong." Perplexed, the man answered, "Why not? She's my
daughter. " 73
This story demonstrates the law's role in communicating values, or at-
tempting to communicate values.74 Prosecution for crimes is one of soci-
billion, was collected through a private justice action, the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act (FCA). FCA News, supra note 57, at 18 [hereinafter FCA News]. As one De-
partment of Justice official explained in 1996: "The recovery of over $1 billion demon-
strates that the public-private partnership encouraged by the statute [the FCA works and
is an effective tool in our continuing fight against fraudulent use of public funds." TAXPAY-
ERS AGAINST FRAUD, THE 1986 FALSE CLAIMS AcT AMENDMENTS, TENTH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT 15 (1996) (quoting Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice); see also Subcomm. on Claims Hearing, supra note 48, at 15 (Donald
K. Stern, U.S. Attorney, Mass. Dist., and Chair, Attorney General's Advisory Comm., U.S.
Dept. of Justice, stating that "the False Claims Act ... is a critical [civil enforcement] tool
in fighting and deterring."); id. at 15, 19 (Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for
Legal Affairs, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, assert-
ing that "[t]he False Claims Act has been an essential tool to protect the integrity of the
Medicare program." To achieve this goal "of 'zero tolerance' of Medicare fraud and abuse
... the Government relies on a number of enforcement options-criminal, civil, and ad-
ministrative, as well as educational outreach efforts. Chief among the enforcement tools
has been the False Claims Act."); id. at 25 (Dr. Robert A. Berenson, director, Center for
Health Care Plans and Providers Administration, Health Care Financing Administration,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, claiming that "the False Claims Act is an impor-
tant tool for... law enforcement ... to pursue fraud and abuse.").
[To deal with health care fraud and abuse,] Congress in recent years [has]
expand[ed] statutory authority and [increased] resources to deal with the
problem. However, none of these things are likely to play a more important
role in recovering improper payments or in acting as a deterrent than the
False Claims Act. Use of the FCA by Federal authorities has become an
important tool for fighting fraud and abuse in many programs, including the
Medicare program.
Id. at 63 (statement of Ruth Blacker, member, National Legislative Counsel, American
Association of Retired Persons).
73. This is a story told by a friend, the grandson of the officer who allegedly had this
encounter. My friend is a creative story teller, to put it mildly. I don't know if the story is
true, but its point about the expressive function of the law is well taken. For sources dis-
cussing this expressive function of the law, see note 74 infra.
74. Sources discussing the expressive function of the law include: ROBERT C. ELLICK-
SON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Symposium: The
Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Use Of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A
Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 221-222 (1965); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure
Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 949, 953, 979 (1997); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law As a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.
J. 1, 22, 24, 37 (1990); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects
for an Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 389; Robert C. Ellickson,
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ety's most potent ways of expressing cultural expectations of behavior.
Incest, rape, sexual assault, and whatever else the father may have com-
mitted in the above story are crimes that convey society's notions of right
and wrong. Together, legislators who pass laws, judges who apply laws,
and police and prosecutors who enforce laws, communicate society's no-
tions of morality. Clearly, the father had missed basic cues of society's
values. The legal system responded.
Numerous scholars have written on the law's expressive function. This
"norms and law" scholarship views norms as "informal social regularities
that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense
of duty."'75 In other words, norms are values reflected in society. Norms
and law scholars suggest, not surprisingly, that the law works most effi-
ciently when it is based on norms that are accepted by most members of
society. 76 Most of us would applaud officers who arrest and prosecutors
who convict the father who engages in sexual relations with his minor
child because these officials are enforcing values we recognize and accept.
It is not clear, however, that the same approval accompanies law enforce-
ment's efforts to prosecute all laws. White collar crime is a prime
example.
Juries' struggles in recent cases demonstrate society's ambivalent atti-
tude toward white collar crime. Examples abound. Dennis L. Kozlowski,
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Michael Harper, Comment on the Tort/Crime
Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 23, 26 (1996); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407 (1958); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351, 362, 365 (1997);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2445 - 2448 (1997);
Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the use of Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 435-440 (1963); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:
The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. REV. 1795, 1863 (1992);
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L.
REV. 338, see especially 397-400 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, Comment, Accounting for
Norms, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 625 (1997); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expecta-
tions of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996) (Rasmusen focuses on the employment
consequences of the stigma associated with being convicted of a crime); Paul H. Robinson,
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Dessert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206-209
(1996); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. L. REV. 857
(1994); Robinson & Danley, supra note 34, at 457, 471-72, 474 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
Cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (people obey the law if they believe
it is just), 58-60 (aside from other factors such as fear of punishment, people obey the law if
they believe it is legitimate), 64 ("The most important normative influence on compliance
with law is the person's assessment that following the law accords with his or her sense of
right and wrong.") (1990).
But see Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 19-20 (1996) (his "hunch" is that the expressive function of the criminal law is
"limited"; "family, friends, religious leaders, even newspapers and television" do more to
affect our core beliefs than does the law).
75. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, supra note 74, at
340.
76. See, e.g., id. at 358-366; ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 74, at 6-8:
Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 979 (1997);
Robinson & Danley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 74, at 454.
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CEO of Tyco, and Mark H. Swartz, Tyco's CFO, were charged with grand
larceny, securities fraud, conspiracy, and falsifying business records.77
Their first trial ended, after six months of trial, with a hung jury,78 al-
though their re-trial resulted in a guilty verdict.79 Richard Scrushy,
founder and CEO of the nation's largest provider of rehabilitation ser-
vices, HealthSouth, was accused in a multi-count fraud indictment arising
from a $2.7 billion overstatement of HealthSouth earnings. 80 After five
months of testimony and twenty-eight days of deliberation, 81 the jury
found Scrushy not guilty on all counts. Theodore Sihpol, former Bank of
America Corp. broker, was acquitted on twenty-nine counts of larceny,
falsifying records and other charges.82 The jury hung on four counts.
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer plans to retry Sihpol on these
counts. 8
3
Ambivalence by the public to law enforcement's efforts to pursue
white collar crimes demonstrates another basic point of norms and law
scholarship: the law can "shape" or influence norms. 84 This influence can
be passive, as when the law simply expresses and communicates accepted
norms of society, or more active, as when the law seeks to change ac-
cepted norms. Arguably, prosecutors' recent surge of white collar prose-
cutions is an "active" effort to shape society's norms. By aggressively
pursuing white collar crime, prosecutors educate society about the nature
of white collar offenses: why these offences are harmful and why the rest
of us should not commit them. When the law "shapes" society's norms,
the law is operating as a "norm entrepreneur."
In the above story, the police officer communicated accepted norms of
society when he responded to the father's incestuous conduct toward his
daughter. The officer's comment to the father, "You can't do that. It's
wrong," was the initial step of such communication. Presumably, the fa-
ther's arrest, indictment, and conviction will follow, all reiterating the of-
ficer's initial communication of the value, "It is wrong." Because the
father's behavior is clearly viewed by society as wrong, prosecution of the
father, unlike the prosecution of white collar offenses, demonstrates the
law's "passive" influence on society's values.
77. Mark Maremont & Chad Bray, Tyco Trial Jurors Say Defendants Weren't Credible,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Tyco Jurors].
78. Carrie Johnson, For Prosecutors, Shorter is Sweeter, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005 at
Dl.
79. Tyco Jurors, supra note 76.
80. Reed Abelson & Jonathan Glater, A Style That Connected With Hometown Jurors,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at Cl.
81. Dan Morse, Chad Terhune & Ann Carrns, HealthSouth's Scrushy is Acquitted,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005 at Al.
82. Id.
83. Arden Dale, Moving the Market: Spitzer Plans to Retry Sihpol on 4 Counts in
Fund-Trade Case, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005 at C3.
84. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 74, at 35; McAdams, supra note 74, at 348.
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IV. IMPACT ON THE LAW'S EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION
WHEN PRIVATE CITIZENS ARE GIVEN
PROSECUTORIAL POWER
A. MORAL AMBIGUITY: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INCEST AND FINANCIAL FRAUD
Return to the misbehaving father, let us assume that the father's neigh-
bors do not know what he has done to his daughter. They do know that
police have arrested him, taken him into custody, charged him with a
crime, and convicted him. From this information, the father's neighbors
likely will conclude that the father has done a bad thing. They likely
would not have this view, however, if the police, the prosecutor and the
jury (assuming the father goes to trial rather than pleading guilty) are
viewed as corrupt, ignorant, or otherwise motivated by issues not relevant
to guilt (for example, racial, ethnic, or religious stereotypes). If that were
the case, the neighbors more likely will view the allegations as untrue,
unfounded, and motivated by ill-will. The point is that the respect in
which the justice system is held is essential to the system's ability to
communicate.
Of course, if the father's neighbors know that he has been having sex-
ual relations with his minor daughter, they will conclude that he has done
a bad thing, regardless of whether the judicial system becomes involved.
Because incest and rape of a minor are universally viewed as morally
wrong, no one, other than a sociopath, needs law enforcement to identify
the wrongfulness of such acts. In fact, if it becomes known that law en-
forcement officials knew of, but ignored, the father's conduct, law en-
forcement's reputation would suffer.
For our purposes of viewing the communicative impact of appointing
private prosecutors, another hypothetical is helpful. Assume the CEO of
a public company has authorized false reporting of the company's fi-
nances. When the CEO's neighbors hear of this conduct, chances are
they will not immediately conclude that the CEO has done a wrong thing.
Unlike the news of the father's rape of his daughter, which is malum in se
conduct, false reporting of financial data is not universally viewed as bad
or evil. In fact, depending upon their backgrounds and professions, the
CEO's neighbors may assume that the CEO is a victim: that he has been
wronged, scapegoated, targeted unfairly, or misunderstood by business
neophytes or uninformed law enforcement officials. At worst, they may
think that the CEO and his staff simply made mistakes because of arcane
government regulations or accounting rules. Once the CEO is arrested,
however, some of his neighbors will probably change their minds and
conclude, simply because he was arrested, that his conduct was more
wrong than they initially assumed. When the matter advances further
and the CEO is charged with and convicted of crimes, either after a pub-
lic trial or a public plea of guilty, more neighbors are likely to conclude
that the CEO did a bad thing. Law enforcement's response of arrest,
indictment and conviction helps to communicate this. But again, this is
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true only to the extent the neighbors respect law enforcement's ability,
motives and actions.
Now, our question: what happens to the law's communicative ability
when private citizens join law enforcement and together allege that the
CEO has falsified company finances? If the private citizen is a knowl-
edgeable and respected individual, a highly-placed executive in the
CEO's company, for example, the public's perception of the wrongfulness
of the CEO's behavior is likely to increase. If, in addition to joining pub-
lic prosecutors in asserting that the CEO has done a wrong thing, this
executive explains publicly, in ways that only an insider can do, how and
why the CEO's conduct is wrong and who has been harmed by his con-
duct, this executive will enlighten law enforcement as well as the public
about the CEO's activity. In this way, the private individual enhances the
communicative impact of the law.
If, however, the private citizen who joins public prosecutors lacks a
business background, is ill-informed about the business transactions at
issue, or appears to have an ulterior motive (scorned for a promotion
perhaps), her involvement with law enforcement likely will muddle the
message otherwise sent that the CEO has done something wrong. Identi-
fying this individual as law enforcement's prosecution partner likely will
perpetuate the bias that the CEO is the victim of bungled and misplaced
allegations. In addition, of course, an ill-informed individual will not be
able to articulate well for the public why and how the CEO's conduct is
wrong.
This is the first, and not surprising, lesson of recruiting private citizens
to serve with public prosecutors. A "quality" individual increases the
law's expressive function. A "less than quality" individual decreases this
function. In short, law enforcement inherits the strengths and weak-
nesses of the "private attorneys general" who join it.
B. PRIVATE PROSECUTORS AND PROFIT
Assuming that the "quality" of the private individual who joins prose-
cutors affects the expressive function of the law, the question arises
whether it matters whether an acknowledged "quality" relator stands to
profit personally by joining ranks with law enforcement. This is a rele-
vant question because a number of the private attorney general statues
bestow generous financial rewards on individuals who join prosecutors in
successful actions. 85  Although research consistently shows that
whistleblowers rarely are motivated by the potential for monetary gain,86
85. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2003); see text and accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
86. The characteristic that appears to dominate in the "whistleblower personality pro-
file" is a strong sense of right and wrong. Philip Jos et al., In Praise of Difficult People: A
Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 552, 558 (1989); Jacqueline
P. Taylor, The World of Whistleblowers: Are They Sinners or Saints? WOMEN OF COLO-
RADO.COM, 15 (Feb. 2,1998) at http://www.womenofcolorado.com/Articles/le020298.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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we understandably question an individual's credibility when she stands to
gain financially by bringing suit.
As every prosecutor who has dealt with an informant knows, any in-
formant confronts credibility issues if he is compensated (either finan-
cially or in the form of reduced charges) for his cooperation with law
enforcement. However, the typical informant is not an appropriate frame
of reference for evaluating private attorneys general. The typical inform-
ant is a person who has been deeply involved in significant prior criminal
activity before his cooperation with law enforcement. In fact, it is his
criminal history that makes him valuable to law enforcement as an in-
formant. Worse from a credibility stand-point, most informants have par-
ticipated in the criminal activity at issue, although again, this is exactly
why they are valuable to law enforcement in the case at hand.87
By comparison, a typical private attorney general has not been in-
volved in prior criminal activity and, while she may be aware of the activ-
ity at issue, she was not involved in it other than to complain about it.
The FCA, in fact, limits the financial award to private litigants who have
been involved in the criminal activity at issue.88 Thus, a relator in an
FCA case rarely provides key, if any, testimony. Rather, the relator's
common role is to assist law enforcement in investigating questionable
activity. She does so by explaining what was going on, identifying poten-
tial witnesses and documents, and by providing context about the com-
pany, the industry and the transactions at issue.89 Also, for practical
purposes, the judges of a relator's credibility are DOJ attorneys. DOJ
attorneys are the ones to decide whether the relator is believable and
knowledgeable enough for DOJ to devote resources investigating the re-
lator's allegations, and to join the relator as a co-plaintiff.90 They are
87. The recent testimony of Kenneth Rice, a former Enron executive and government
witness in a fraud prosecution of five other Enron executives, is an apt example. Rice
testified about a key presentation to analysts; on cross examination it became clear that the
presentation was never made. John R. Emshwiller, 'Cooperators' May Complicate Trials,
WALL ST. J., May 9, 2005 at C5. As one expert notes, "By definition, you are dealing with
dishonest people." As noted by the Wall Street Journal:
Mr. Rice's testimony also highlights a broader and potentially more dis-
turbing question regarding the reliability of admitted criminals who testify
against former colleagues in hopes of obtaining reduced penalties. While use
of such "cooperators" is often essential to obtaining convictions, even prose-
cutors admit it is a dangerous business. Some cooperators simply lie in hopes
of getting a lighter penalty. Some others, in their desire to please prosecu-
tors, convince themselves they are telling the truth even if they aren't.
Id.
88. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (2003).
89. Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 4, at 611-14 (description of assistance ren-
dered by the relator in United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group); 617-19
(description of assistance rendered by relator in investigation of Smith Barney); 616 (dis-
cussing assistance rendered by relators in general); Bucy et al., Statutes and Fraud, supra
note 4, at 465-70 (discussing the assistance of Zachery Bentley in bringing a state qui tam
lawsuit against Ven-a-Care).
90. Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 4, at 646-54 (discussing the government's de-
cision-making process when a relator is available; note that the government is referred to
as "R" (regulator) and the relator is referred to as "P" (private party)).
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important judges. Realistically, without the DOJ's resources, the rela-
tor's case is over.
Because of the difference in relators and most cooperating informants
and because the judges of most relators credibility are DOB attempts
rather than juries, it would not appear that the prospect of financial gain
would tarnish a relator's credibility or ability to communicate the wrong-
fulness of white collar crime.
C. How TO RECRUIT "QUALITY" PRIVATE PROSECUTORS
Accepting that the law's expressive function is enhanced when
respected, knowledgeable private individuals join prosecutors in pursuing
white collar offenders and that this function is diminished when disre-
spected or ill-informed private individuals join law enforcement; the chal-
lenge is clear: how can law enforcement recruit quality individuals and
discourage the others? Again, the FCA model provides some guidance. 91
Most FCA statutes include the following features that seek to entice re-
spectable and knowledgeable individuals as relators: requiring relators to
provide the DOJ with extensive information about suspected fraud
before filing suit;92 requiring that the FCA suit be filed in camera 93 so as
to protect a defendant's reputation from frivolous charges for fraud; and
giving the DOJ statutory powers to monitor the relator's conduct in a
case.94 In addition, FCA practice has evolved to encourage "quality" re-
lators and to discourage others. In particular, the DOJ is more likely to
intervene in a case when quality relators, counsel, and information is
presented.95 Since a case's chance of success is improved considerably
when the DOJ intervenes, weak cases brought by ill-informed relators
tend to go away if the DOJ opts not to intervene. 96
These statutory features and FCA practice are helpful in encouraging
"quality" private attorneys general and in discouraging others. However,
before more "quality" individuals are willing to join law enforcement and
serve as private prosecutors, 97 two currently accepted "norms" need to
change. First, there needs to be a stronger societal consensus that eco-
nomic wrongdoing is bad and should be deterred.98 Second, there needs
91. There are other challenges such as ensuring that the private individuals do not
bring frivolous or ill-conceived suits, absorb resources of government agencies that review
or investigate charges brought by such individuals, discourage industry from setting ambi-
tious goals for itself, generate precedent harmful to public prosecutors' efforts, waste judi-
cial resources when courts respond to ill-conceived private actions. Bucy, Private Justice,
supra note 4, at 62-68.
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(A) (2003); Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 949-51, 958-
59.
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2003).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2003).
95. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 4, at 50-52, 58, 68-69.
96. Id. at 58.
97. For a discussion of the disincentives for individuals in joining prosecutors see Bucy,
Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 948-58.
98. For a discussion of the corrosive impact of economic wrongdoing on individuals
and society as a whole; see Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 928-40.
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to be a shift in perceptions of loyalty: we must be willing to put the wel-
fare of our larger community ahead of loyalty to those near at hand.99
When there is a strong societal consensus that economic malfeasance is
wrong, more people will be willing to blow the whistle on it. When the
government successfully prosecutes (either civilly or criminally) economic
wrongdoing, the justice system builds this consensus. For government of-
ficials to build this consensus more effectively, however, the government
needs to send a clearer message. It can do so.
"Lying, stealing, and cheating." No matter how complex a white collar
case may be, if prosecutors are not able to explain to a jury how what's
really at issue is simply lying, stealing, and cheating, juries will, and
should, acquit. As every experienced prosecutor knows, obfuscation and
tedious, laborious presentation of evidence is a sure route to acquittal.
Policy-makers, whether in the DOJ or Congress, should take note of this
standard lore of trial strategy. Public perception matters. White collar
offenses need to be explained'0° to the public, as well as to juries. It is,
after all, members of the public who sit on juries, elect legislators, and
apply pressure on political leaders. Perhaps most importantly, it is mem-
bers of the public who communicate norms to each other. When filing
false financial records is universally viewed as wrong, and harmful to the
rest of us, those who engage in such conduct will be scorned by society.
This communication of values is more powerful than anything prosecu-
tors or legislators can do to influence behavior.10 1
For this reason, the DOJ, Congress, and other policy-makers should do
more to communicate to the public the wrongfulness of financial mis-
deeds. Strategic use of the prosecutor's "bully pulpit" is one way to do
SO. 10 2 Clear, concise, comprehendible indictments that explain to the
public, as well as to the jury, what happened and why it is harmful are
key. Press releases issued by prosecutors that better explain what oc-
curred and who is hurt are essential. While most prosecutors' offices rou-
tinely issue press releases at various stages of a criminal matter,
explanations of what happened and how the conduct affects victims too
often are lacking. Especially after a matter has concluded and there is no
concern about prejudicing a fair trial, a gripping account of the facts and
impact on victims is feasible. Greater attention by prosecutors to their
99. For a discussion of how whistleblowing challenging existing mores of loyalty, see
Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 963-66.
100. For discussions of the importance of communicating to the public about white col-
lar prosecutions, civil and criminal, see Bucy, Games and Stories, supra note 4, at 632-33,
652-53 (discussing "signaling" to industry and the public that occurs from filing and pursu-
ing lawsuits); Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 969-70 (discussing the
importance of publicity in recruiting whistleblowers); Bucy, Iterated Games, supra note 4,
at 1031-32.
101. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1597-1600 (2000); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Enforcing Norms: When the Law Gets in the Way, 7 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 4, 9-14
(1997); Lynch, supra note 2, at 46.
102. Cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Eric A. Posner, Law and
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1799 (2000).
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role as "norm entrepreneurs" and their duty to educate the public will
help build greater societal consensus that economic cheats truly are
wrong and harmful.10 3
In addition to more thoroughly explaining to the public what is at
stake, prosecutors need to win more and lose less. "Guilty" is a powerful
statement. It communicates that citizens have determined that a defen-
dant has done a bad thing and deserves the community's condemnation.
A defendant's sentencing communicates that we should expect to pay
dearly for doing this bad act.1°4 Convicted defendants go to prison.
Their assets are forfeited. They suffer public scorn, loss of job, emotional
pain, embarrassment, uncertainty, and family stress. They incur enor-
mous legal fees. Their companies, shareholders, employees, bondholders,
and customers suffer.
A "not guilty" verdict sends just as powerful of a message. Although a
"not guilty" verdict means only that the government failed to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt, the public generally perceives "not
guilty" as "innocent." In fact, to most people, "not guilty" often com-
municates that the government has unfairly targeted and victimized the
defendant.
Prosecutors can ill-afford to lose a criminal case. This brings us back to
punitive civil actions. Pursuing economic wrongdoing civilly and success-
fully is better than criminally prosecuting such wrongdoing and losing.
Whenever success in a criminal action is uncertain, prosecutors should
utilize punitive civil actions instead of criminal prosecution. In white col-
lar cases, uncertainty often is present. One need only recall recent ill-
fated white collar criminal prosecutions to confirm this.10 5 Richard
Scrushy, indicted CEO of HealthSouth, Inc., faced thirty-six felony
counts on fraud and money laundering charges. Five CFOs (every CFO
in the history of HealthSouth, Inc.) 10 6 testified under oath that Scrushy 10 7
directed a $2.7 billion fraud at HealthSouth. 10 8 Pundits described the evi-
103. Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal
for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 370 (1999); William
J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1897-99 (2000).
104. Cf. Lynch, supra note 2, at 44-47; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law
Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1839 (2000).
105. Morse, Terhune & Carrns, supra note 81, at Al.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Abelson & Glater, supra note 80, at C1.
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dence as "strong," 10 9 "overwhelming," '110 and "massive." '1 I They were
wrong. The jury returned verdicts of "not guilty" on every count. One
can only speculate as to why there was such a disconnect between the
pundits and jurors, but clearly, using a punitive civil action instead of
criminal prosecution would have enhanced the government's chance of
success.
Before respected and knowledgeable individuals will join prosecutors
in proving that colleagues have committed fraud, "the value of loyalty
and service to the larger community must be viewed as paramount to the
value of loyalty to ... one's company or industry."' 1 2 The justice system
can help shift this norm of loyalty by publicizing the important and valua-
ble role of individuals who have become private attorneys general. Since
most cases where individuals join prosecutors conclude in settlement,
there are few high profile trials dramatizing this assistance. Thus, proac-
tive and constant publicity is necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
With great power comes great responsibility. Prosecutors initiate pro-
ceedings that will forever change someone's life. To share this power
with private individuals who stand to personally profit and who are not
subject to the cultural and professional constraints on prosecutors is a
significant policy decision. This article has addressed this decision. It
does so by focusing on the issue of whether delegating prosecutorial
power affects the law's expressive function and its ability to communicate
values of right and wrong. In the area of economic misconduct, which
generally is not viewed as evil, this communicative function of the law is
especially important. Prosecution of economic mis-conduct communi-
cates that such conduct is wrong, that it will be detected and prosecuted,
and that those who do it will be punished, shamed, and suffer bad conse-
quences. Such a message can deter others from engaging in such conduct.
109. "It's a stunner [the not guilty verdict] given how strong the government's case
seemed to be." (quoting Gregory J. Wallance, a former prosecutor and current partner at
Kaye Scholer, New York). Id.
Experts on white-collar crime said the case gave federal prosecutors their
best chance yet in the corporate scandals to secure the conviction of a former
chief executive. Fourteen former HealthSouth executives and accounting
managers who have already pled guilty to various fraud charges-including
all five of the company's former chief financial officers-are expected to tes-
tify against Mr. Scrushy.
Milt Freudenheim & Eric Lichtblau, Former HealthSouth Chief Indicted by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at C1.
110. Associated Press, Scrushy Acquitted of Fraud at HealthSouth, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2005 ("Joel Androphy, a Houston attorney who specialized in white-collar cases, called the
evidence against Scrushy 'overwhelming."').
111. Associated Press, Jury Acquits Scrushy on All Counts in Fraud Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2005 ("A corporate law specialist who had followed the trial was stunned. 'There
was a mass of evidence against him. I certainly expected the jury to convict.').
112. Bucy, Information as a Commodity, supra note 4, at 963.
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This article has suggested that the law's expressive function can be en-
hanced but also harmed when prosecutorial discretion is delegated to pri-
vate individuals to whom power has been delegated. This outcome
depends upon the "quality" of the individual. To recruit more "quality"
individuals to serve as private attorneys general, our judicial system
should recognize its role as a "norm entrepreneur." "Norm entrepre-
neurs" change existing values in society. Thus, before more "quality" in-
dividuals will be willing to serve as "private attorneys general" joining
law enforcement to battle white collar crime, there must be broader soci-
etal recognition that economic misconduct is wrong. There must also be a
greater loyalty to the community at large than to one's work colleagues.
This brings us full circle: deputizing more "quality" private prosecutors
will help these norms evolve.
